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Abstract
The financial and eurozone crises highlighted the inadequacy of the original governance structures of the eurozone.
In response, a range of reforms were launched, including the creation of a European banking union. In practice, some
elements of the banking union were delayed by division among member states and the breakdown of the Franco-German
motor, such as the question of the operationalization of the single resolution mechanism and fund or the deposit insur-
ance scheme. In addition, eurozone governance—which would once have been regarded as a technocratic issue—became
increasingly politicized. The aim of this article is to study the extent to which the banking union was scrutinized by parlia-
ment and to what degree this reflects material interests and ideas. For this purpose, it focuses on salience (i.e., howmuch
attention the issue received) and polarization (i.e., the divergence of positions). The analysis of the resolutions and debates
of the German Bundestag and French Assemblée Nationale, i.e., the parliaments of two key states in EU decision-making
on banking union, finds that the German government was indeed closely scrutinized, whereas the French government was
relatively unconstrained.
Keywords
banking union; European deposit insurance scheme; France; Germany; parliament; single resolution fund;
single resolution mechanism; single supervisory mechanism
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Reforming the Institutions of Eurozone Governance” edited by Anna-Lena Högenauer
(University of Luxembourg), David Howarth (University of Luxembourg) and Moritz Rehm (University of Luxembourg).
© 2021 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007 created high costs for taxpay-
ers and led to a hike in sovereign debt when EU mem-
ber states stepped in to recapitalize banks. The resulting
frustration motivated policymakers to create a banking
union. The goal was to stabilize the European banking
system through stricter rules and capital requirements
for banks, a more centralized banking supervision on the
European level, a European approach to bank restructur-
ing and resolution that would limit the burden on tax-
payers, and a European deposit guarantee scheme that
would protect savers (Howarth & Quaglia, 2016b).
Despite broad agreement on the desirability of pro-
tecting savers and taxpayers, there were substantial dis-
agreements on the details. Not all member states had
been affected by the financial crisis to the same extent:
some were able to bear the burden alone, while oth-
ers could not. There was a risk that the costs and ben-
efits of banking union would be unevenly distributed
across member states, and that risk-averse banks might
end up paying for risk-taking banks. Questions relating
to the mutualization of risk, the inclusion of small and
local banks in the scheme, and also the correct decision-
making bodies became disputed. Franco-German leader-
ship broke down as the two countries were on opposing
sides on most questions (Schild, 2018). The two coun-
tries were nevertheless important in the negotiations
due to their sheer size and economic weight (Cassell
& Hutcheson, 2019; Howarth & Quaglia, 2013). This is
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particularly obvious in Germany’s veto of the creation of
a European deposit guarantee scheme, which is general-
ly attributed to high domestic pressure (Schild, 2020).
In line with the aims of this thematic issue
(Högenauer & Rehm, 2021), the article aims to analyse
the domestic politics of the banking union in France and
Germany through the positioning of their parliaments
and parties. To what extent did the two governments
face parliamentary pressure to defend specific positions?
To what extent did the parliamentary politics reflect
the material interests of the country and/or public atti-
tudes towards the issue? The analysis will focus on the
Lower Houses, i.e., the Bundestag and the Assemblée
Nationale (AN). The Lower Houses perform the main
function of representing the national electorate. By con-
trast, the Upper Houses, the Bundesrat and the Senate
are not directly elected and the Bundesrat’s primary
function is not to represent the electorate but the state
governments. They are extremely diverse in their com-
position and powers.
The first question relates to literature that shows
that Eurozone governance has become more salient and
controversial among parliamentarians (Auel & Raunio,
2014; Closa&Maatsch, 2014; Högenauer, 2019;Wendler,
2014). As a result, national parliaments have become
more assertive in their scrutiny of key EU and Eurozone
decisions. The German Bundestag is particularly active
on eurozone crisis policies and has extensive powers
(Auel & Höing, 2014; Auel, Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2014;
Höing, 2013; Moschella, 2017). The question is to what
extent these dynamics led to a close scrutiny of bank-
ing union that could potentially constrain governments
(Donnelly, 2018). This is highly relevant, as EU crisis poli-
cymaking has often been criticized for lacking democrat-
ic input and debate (e.g., Sebastiaõ, 2021). An answer
to this question requires an examination of the parlia-
mentary salience of banking union, the timing of debates
and resolutions, and the polarization of debates. By par-
liamentary salience, we mean how frequently the issue
is raised in debates (Hutter & Grande, 2014; see also
De Wilde, 2011; De Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016).
Polarization captures the extent to which actors adopt
different positions on an issue. In this multi-level con-
text, it can refer to either disagreement between differ-
ent groups of MPs or the disagreement of national politi-
cians with European proposals.
In addition, the timing of activities matters: If par-
liaments hope to influence European negotiations or to
control the government’s position, the debates would
have to predate the adoption of the policy. If plenary
debates occur after the decision, they are reactive and
can at most comment on the performance of the govern-
ment or indicate (dis)agreementwith the policy, but they
can no longer shape the policy.
The question about the extent to which the debates
reflect ideas and economic interests will draw upon
the societal approach as used by Schirm (2011, 2020)
and Van Loon (2021). Schirm (2011, 2020) defines ideas
as values held by the public. Material interests are
determined by the relative weight of economic sec-
tors. So far, existing studies often emphasize the impor-
tance ofmaterial interests or structural economic factors
in explaining government positions in eurozone crisis
decision-making (e.g., Tarlea, Bailer, & Degner, 2019),
for example, whether banks are largely domestically or
foreign-owned (Spendzharova, 2014), on the role of bank
capitalization levels and bank-industry ties (Howarth &
Quaglia, 2016a), and on the qualitative composition of
the banking sector in terms of whether there be large
national champions or decentralized networks of coop-
erative and savings banks (Commain, 2021). The qualita-
tive composition is particularly important in the context
of France (large champions) and Germany (networks of
savings and cooperative banks) as it fuels different views
on what type of bank should be covered by European
mechanisms andhowmuch they should contribute finan-
cially to the stabilization of the European banking sector.
However, Van Loon (2021) shows that ideas and interests
do not necessarily pull in opposite directions, but can
potentially work to reinforce each other.
In this vein, the following sections will first provide a
short overview of the main elements of banking union
and the positions of the French and German govern-
ments. Then French andGerman ideas and interests with
regard to banking union will be analysed based on exist-
ing surveys, the literature on the politicization of bank-
ing union, and structural economic factors. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion of the data collection on parlia-
mentary scrutiny and an analysis of the findings in terms
of the salience and polarization of banking union in the
Bundestag and the AN.
2. Banking Union and Franco-German Divisions
The decisions on banking union represent one of the
biggest steps forward in European integration since the
launch of EMU (Degner & Leuffen, 2019; Epstein &
Rhodes, 2016).
In 2013, agreement was reached on the Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for Eurozone banks:
Located within the European Central Bank (ECB), it is
responsible for the direct supervision of systemically rele-
vant banks and banks with substantial cross-border activ-
ities, while other banks are supervised by national super-
visors under the responsibility of the ECB (Gren, Howarth,
& Quaglia, 2015; Kern, 2014).
In 2014, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)
was established in order to reduce the costs of bank
resolutions for taxpayers. The Single Resolution Board
takes decisions for those banks supervised directly by
the ECB. In the event of a resolution, the bank’s share-
holders and creditors are first bailed-in, then the nation-
al compartment of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF)
steps in. The national compartments are financed by
levies from national banks and are backed up by nation-
al credit lines from the member state. By 2023, the
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national compartments will be merged (Howarth &
Quaglia, 2016b).
In 2015, the European Commission planned the cre-
ation of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS)
with the aim of merging national deposit insurance
schemes. However, this proposal was ultimately blocked
by division in the Council (Cassell & Hutcheson, 2019).
In European decision-making on banking union, the
established pattern of Franco-German leadership on
monetary policymaking was disrupted. The two coun-
tries were often on opposing sides of the argument
(Schild, 2018). They disagreed on the purpose of bank-
ing union and the costs and benefits of banking union
generated distributional conflict. In the absence of a
Franco-German agreement, EU institutions filled the
gap and provided supranational leadership (Nielsen &
Smeets, 2018), but some elements of banking union
were delayed or blocked.
Disagreements emerged largely along two dividing
lines: the extent of risk-sharing across member states
and the centralization of decision-making (Cassell &
Hutcheson, 2019; Schild, 2018). France, Italy, and Spain
pushed for a rapid move towards banking union to dis-
rupt the feedback loop between banking crises and
sovereigns: States tend to rescue national banks with
public funds thereby potentially entering a public debt
crisis, which then affects national banks, which hold
public debt. Germany, on the other hand, wanted to
avoid sharing the risks of bailouts in other Eurozone
states and preferred to focus on avoiding future crises
(Schild, 2018).
As a result, whereas France wanted the European
banking supervision and resolution to cover all Eurozone
banks, Germany wanted it to cover only on systemically
relevant banks, rather than its smaller savings and coop-
erative banks. Domestically, there were doubts about
whether the ECB was the ideal banking supervisor giv-
en the potential conflict of interest with its role in mon-
etary policy (cf. Högenauer, 2019), but the government
ultimately agreed that the ECB should take on this role.
Where France wanted the European Commission to play
a key role in the restructuring and resolution of banks,
Germany preferred a network of national resolution
authorities (cf. Degner & Leuffen, 2019). On this issue,
Germany ultimately got its way in the form of a Single
Resolution Board consisting of a Chair, four full-time
members, and a representative of each national resolu-
tion authority. The Commission and Council of the EU
would be able to veto Single Resolution Board decisions
(Schild, 2018).
In addition, unlike France, Germany wanted to lim-
it the use of public funds—and especially European
funds—in the recapitalization of banks. As a result,
whereas France favoured the use of the ESM to recapi-
talize banks with bad assets, Germany insisted that lega-
cy assets should be a national responsibility and that the
ESM should be used only for future crises. It also insist-
ed on a recapitalization sequence: first private sharehold-
ers, creditors and large depositors, then national resolu-
tion funds financed via bank levies, then national public
capital, and then as a last resort, European capital from
the ESM. The bailing in of private capital would reduce
the burden on the taxpayer, and by asking for national
recapitalization first, European risk-sharing would be lim-
ited. Germany also wanted to reduce the contribution
from small banks, whereas France tried to limit the con-
tributions from large banks, and there was disagreement
on whether there should be a single resolution fund or a
network of national funds. Finally, for the same reasons
of aversion against the mutualization of risk, Germany
vehemently blocked the creation of a EDIS using the argu-
ment that risks to bank’s balance sheetswould have to be
reduced first (Schild, 2020).
3. French and German Ideas and Interests on
Banking Union
The financial crisis harmed trust in the ECB. According to
the 2010 Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2010),
45% of French and German respondents distrusted
the ECB, but in Germany distrust was growing partic-
ularly fast. The same survey showed that support for
European banking supervision, European supervision
when public money was spent to rescue financial insti-
tutions, and regulation of the financial sector was high-
er in Germany (80%, 80% and 77% respectively) than
in France (73%, 68% and 71%). As the eurozone cri-
sis dragged on, German attitudes towards EU banking
supervision became less positive, as did French attitudes:
Eurobarometer 81 (European Commission, 2014) shows
that 75% of German and 67% of French respondents
were in favour of banking supervision.
Thus, the German public is actually more strongly
in favour of the fundamental idea of a banking union,
despite the negative debate in the media. These sur-
veys do, of course, only capture very general attitudes
and cannot provide information on the kind of banking
supervision citizens want. Nevertheless, it is interesting
that there is a disconnect between the reluctance of
the German government in decision-making on banking
union and the overwhelming support of Germans for the
idea of European banking supervision.
In addition, the fact that there were only 4% of
‘don’t knows’ by German and 13% by French respon-
dents on the question on banking supervision (European
Commission, 2010) is an indication that the public
considered this issue quite important. Schild (2018)
argues that the German government—unlike the French
parliament—was under particular pressure due to the
high public salience of European policies, the predom-
inantly negative attitudes towards solidarity between
countries, and the emergence of a Eurosceptic right-wing
party, the AfD. The public salience of EDIS was particu-
larly high in Germany (Cassell & Hutcheson, 2019). Kriesi
and Grande (2016) also argue that politicization of euro-
zone crisis policies was particularly high in Germany,
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whereas politicization in France only reached 40% of the
German level.
This is likely to influence parliamentary scrutiny:
Baglioni and Hurrelmann (2016) argue that there are dif-
ferent arenas of politicization, such as the citizen are-
na, an intermediary arena for business groups or oth-
er specialized actors, and an institutional arena (e.g., a
parliament). The different arenas are connected, in that
public salience can raise the salience for politicians, and
the strategies of politicians in parliaments can contribute
to the (de)politicization of an issue (cf. Gheyle, 2019;
Wendler, 2019). According to Gormley (1986), the com-
plexity and public salience of an issue interact to cre-
ate different policymaking dynamics. When complexity
is high (as is the case with banking union) and public
salience is low, politicians operate in ‘board room’ mode:
Affected business groups can influence politics and politi-
cians are free to make compromises as the media and
public do not take much interest. However, in such a
situation politicians deal with complex issues as little
as possible, due to the absence of electoral incentives.
When complexity and salience are both high, politics take
place in ‘operating room’ mode: politicians are not free
to make compromises, as the public has strong expec-
tations and the media reports on the issue (although
Gormley suggests that reporting is likely to be faulty).
The problem with this typology is that its description
of the dynamics does not entirely fit the European con-
text, as there is an underlying assumption that diffi-
cult decision-making is delegated to agencies. In the EU
context, however, the most contentious decisions often
have to be taken at the level of the European Council or
at least the Council ofMinisters. As a result, high salience
and complexity do not necessarily lead to delegation to
bureaucrats. Banking union in practice corresponds bet-
ter to Gormley and Boccuti’s (2001) typology of issues
based on conflict and public salience, where they argue
that issues that governments insist on staying in control
of issues that are salient and conflictual, whereas they
involve stakeholders in issues that are high in conflict
and low in salience. In the US case, the absence of con-
flict and salience results in the federal level having lit-
tle interest in tightly controlling the state level. In our
case, we assume that the incentives for parliamentary
scrutiny are low. This is also in line with the argument
by De Wilde et al. (2016) that politicization is driven by
the critics rather than supporters of an issue. If we take
conflict to mean the opposition to the European plans
and/or conflict between domestic actors, this would
mean that:
H1: Politicians take business interests on board when
the public salience of the issue is low, but the conflict
on the issue (e.g., between businesses and the EU) is
high (expectation: Germany on SSM, SRF);
H2: When both conflict and public salience are high,
politicians take control of the decision, but have
limited political room for manoeuvre (expectation:
Germany on EDIS);
H3: When public salience and conflict are low (expec-
tation: France, especially on the SSM, SRF, EDIS),
parliamentarians will have no interest in the close
scrutiny of executives;
H4: Parliaments are more likely to be proactive in the
face of high public salience.
However, the precise powers of the parliaments could
be considered a mediating factor. While national parlia-
ments have no direct influence over EU policymaking,
they can put pressure on their national governments
to represent the ‘correct’ position in the Council of the
EU via committee and plenary debates (Raunio, 2009)
and resolutions. In this context, a high level of activity is
usually used to signal that the parliament considers the
issue important. However, the AN has moderate scruti-
ny powers over EU affairs and is usually less active while
the Bundestag has strong scrutiny powers and tends to
be quite active (Auel et al., 2014). The Bundestag has
control over the plenary agenda, whereas the French
government had almost complete control over the ple-
nary agenda of the AN until 2008/2009 (Auel & Raunio,
2014). However, following constitutional amendments,
the AN now controls roughly one-third of its agenda
and can hold plenary debates on EU affairs if it sees
fit. Indeed, it tends to schedule at least one EU debate
per month (Thomas & Tacea, 2014). In addition, the
opposition has the right to table motions in both par-
liaments. In the case of the AN, there is a specific tool,
‘European resolutions,’ which can be adopted by the
European Affairs Committee on virtually any EU docu-
ment and which become final if the relevant sectoral
committee does not counteract them (Thomas & Tacea,
2014). In the case of the Bundestag, one-quarter of
MPs can force the government to publicly explain why
it deviated from a previously passed Bundestag resolu-
tion (Höing, 2015). Thus, while a lower number of AN ple-
nary debates is to be expected given the influence of the
government, the AN is not substantially weaker than the
Bundestag with regard to resolutions. Substantial differ-
ences in activity have to be ascribed also to different lev-
els of motivation. For example, Högenauer and Howarth
(2019) have shown that the AN scrutinizes the Banque
de France more actively than the Bundestag scrutinizes
the Bundesbank, despite the fact that the Bundestag is
also considered stronger than the AN outside EU affairs:
Because it chooses to take an interest.
In terms of material interests, there are arguably
two factors at play, the general divide between credi-
tor and debtor states, and the composition of the bank-
ing sector. Thus, Lehner and Wasserfallen (2019; see
alsoWasserfallen, Leuffen, Kudrna, &Degner, 2019) stud-
ied government positions on 47 issues of the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) reform and found that the
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predominant dimension was between fiscal transfer (led
by France) and fiscal discipline (led by Germany). This
dimension had very strong explanatory power for sever-
al banking union-related issues, such as banking supervi-
sion, the build-up and mutualization of the SRF and the
fiscal backstop for the SRF. The findings make sense in
light of the high exposure of banks to domestic sovereign
bonds. Both Ongena, Popov, and Van Horen (2016) and
De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016) find that there is a
‘moral suasion’ mechanism whereby banks that are pub-
licly owned or influenced by politicians (e.g., via the
board of directors) collude with national governments
and buy larger quantities of domestic sovereign bonds
than would be in their interest. In the eyes of Germany,
their high exposure to Spanish, Greek, and Italian banks
could affect their stability and therefore the chances of
other European banks having to step in with ‘their’ con-
tributions to the proposed SRF or EDIS. For France, which
started to experience rising public debt during the cri-
sis, there was a correspondingly greater willingness to be
more open to solidarity and transfers between countries.
Secondly, the banking sectors of France andGermany
are structured differently, which also generates differ-
ent material interests. The German banking sector is
organized around three pillars (private banks, corporate
banks, and savings banks) that often consist of smaller
banks that focus on risk adverse operations and SMEs.
The three pillars already had their own deposit insurance
schemes in place, which reduced the perceived need
for a European scheme (Zimmermann, 2013). In addi-
tion, the aim was to avoid the situation in which small,
risk-averse banks might have to cover the losses of large
risk-taking foreign banks. The situation was different for
France, where it was attractive to place large national
champions under a European scheme rather than to risk
having to bail themout nationally (cf. Commain, 2021, on
the French banking sector). On the whole, Zimmermann
(2013) concludes that the existence of strong embedded-
ness of national deposit insurance schemes into differ-
ent varieties of financial capitalism means that a com-
mon deposit insurance scheme is unlikely to emerge.
The strong connections linking the banking sector to
politicians in key countries such as Germany increase the
ability of economic interests to influence policymaking.
4. Data Collection
The article analyses plenary debates and proposed reso-
lutions from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2016 cov-
ering the adoption of the first three pillars of banking
union (SSM, SRM, SRF) and the blocking of EDIS. This peri-
od starts before the Commission proposal on the SSM
and ends after a natural break in the data: There were
no debates after February 2016 until 2018.
The analysis focuses on the plenary debates and pro-
posed resolutions. Plenary debates fulfil a communica-
tion function: As they are more likely to attract media
attention, parties and parliamentarians can use them to
demonstrate to voters that they take a close interest in
a certain topic and to communicate their stance on that
topic. Theminutes of Bundestag and AN plenary debates
are published in full and are broadcast live on the internet
and/or TV. Resolutions also make the parliament’s or a
party’s position visible. By contrast, committee meetings
tend to be much less visible (cf. Raunio, 2016). In addi-
tion, the finance committee of the Bundestag does not
publish minutes and meetings are closed to the public.
Due to the different archival systems of the AN and
the Bundestag, the relevant debates had to be select-
ed following different strategies: In the case of the
Bundestag, a keyword search of all plenary debates in
that period was used to identify all debates where the
SSM, the SRM, the SRF, or the deposit guarantee scheme
were mentioned at least once. The German names of
these policies were used as a search term. In a second
step, plenary debates specifically on banking union were
filtered out through a manual analysis of the titles and
contents. This allowed us to identify 18 debates on bank-
ing union. The electronic archive of theANdoes not allow
for a keyword search of plenary debates but publishes
the topics of the debates in an easy-to-browse format.
Therefore, all debates that could potentially be on bank-
ing union were preselected. Then a manual analysis of
the debates showed that only four were specifically on
banking union. In both the Bundestag and the AN, one
debate can cover several pillars of banking union.
In addition, a keyword searchwas used to identify rel-
evant resolutions.
In order to measure the degree of polarization, i.e.,
the extent to which opinions diverge (De Wilde, 2011;
De Wilde et al., 2016; Hutter & Grande, 2014), three
German debates on the SSM, the SRM/SRF, and EDIS
were analysed in depth. In light of the limited number of
French debates (and the fact that twowere transposition
debates), a debate on banking union is used to analyse
the general position on the SSMand EDIS, while a second
debate covers the SRF. The SRM and SRF are discussed
together, as parliamentary debates usually treat them as
linked. The selected debates are the earliest debates on
the issue.
5. Banking Union in the Bundestag and the
Assemblée Nationale
5.1. Salience and Timing
Figure 1 shows that banking union was indeed a salient
topic for the German Bundestag from an early stage and
that the interest was sustained over time and across
the different policy elements: Banking union was dis-
cussed in 18 plenary debates, 13 of which were specifi-
cally on banking union and five of whichwere debates on
Commission work programs or reports on the European
Council that focused on banking union.
By contrast, in the AN, only four plenary debates
focus on banking union. Two were implementation
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Figure 1. The number of plenary debates on banking union.
debates, one on banking union in general and one on the
SRF. This is in line with H3 that public salience and parlia-
mentary salience are linked and that low public salience
provides low incentives for parliamentary scrutiny.
In addition, the AN’s approach was reactive: Only
AN debate 20140152 of 30 January 2014 on banking
union contains a discussion of the SRF/SRM that pre-
dates the European decision (of July 2014). The oth-
er debates follow European decisions and comment
on the government’s and EU’s performance after the
facts. The Bundestag was far more proactive: The first
EDIS debate of 5 November 2015 preceded the offi-
cial Commission proposal of 24 November. Three SSM
debates and four SRM/SRF debates predate the respec-
tive European decisions. There is thus a mix of German
debates that formulate positions and debates that com-
ment on outcomes. This confirms H4 that high public
salience encourages politicians to be proactive (especial-
ly in the case of EDIS, where the Bundestag opposed
faster than the European Commission could propose).
In addition, the AN adopted one cross-party resolu-
tion in January 2014 encouraging the creation of the SRM
and SRF, the use of the ESM as a backstop, and the cre-
ation of a European deposit guarantee scheme in the
long run. There was one further tabled resolution that
was not adopted. By contrast, there were 19 tabled res-
olutions in the Bundestag, 15 failed opposition resolu-
tions and four adopted government resolutions, confirm-
ing H2, H3, and H4 about the connection between public
salience and parliamentary scrutiny (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Proposed resolutions on banking union.
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5.2. Framing and Polarization
In order to gain greater insight into how the issue was
framed by MPs, all plenary debates were analysed man-
ually. Five representative debates are presented below:
the two French debates on banking union and on the rat-
ification of the SRF, and three Bundestag debates on the
SSM, the SRM/SRF, and on EDIS.
This analysis shows two things: Firstly, the governing
parties defend the European decisions and MPs praise
the achievements of their governments—even in the
case of Germany and the SRM/SRF, where the govern-
ment was originally concerned about the mutualization
of risk. The German opposition is prone to point out
the flaws of decisions, such as the small size of the SRF.
In France, where the government was eager to reach an
agreement and public salience was low, in line with H3,
there is no clear government-opposition divide on the
European policies. Instead, government-opposition argu-
ments focus on the national question of whether the
size of the French banks should be reduced. H2 is cor-
rect in that the German government parties did assume
an active role on the highly salient EDIS, which was dis-
liked by the public and stakeholders, and rejected it even
before the European Commission officially proposed it,
leaving themselves little room for compromise. In line
with H1, for the SSM and SRM/SRF, where German public
opinion and economic interests were sceptical towards
the EU’s plans, but public salience was lower, the govern-
ment parties took on board the interests of stakehold-
ers and argued that these measures clearly should not
apply to savings and cooperative banks. This is broad-
ly in line with a survey of the preferences of French
and German MPs on reforms to the EMU by Blesse,
Boyer, Heinemann, Janeba, and Raj (2019) where French
MPs were found to be more strongly in favour of new
Eurozone competencies.
In addition, it is interesting to note that intra-
party unity was extremely high in Germany across all
parties and that the governing coalitions (CDU-FDP,
then CDU-SPD) also spoke consistently with one voice.
The German government did thus face a clear majority
position that largely reflected its own demands, but also
made it potentially difficult to compromise. The French
government did not face comparable pressure: while all
French parties wanted decisions as close as possible to
the Commission proposals, the low number of debates
and resolutions before decisionsmeant that the pressure
was in practice much lower.
5.2.1. The Positions on the Single Supervisory
Mechanism
AN debate 20140152 of 30 January 2014 on the progress
of banking union and economic integration shows that
all MPs welcomed banking union and the creation of the
SSM, while criticism was limited to details and was not
organized in a strong block of MPs. In line with H3, this
positioning did not constrain the government. Among
the most positive voices are Christophe Caresche (PS)
who defended the choice of the ECB as supervisor and
argued that the in-house separationwouldwork and that
the ECB had a vested interest in the success of bank-
ing union to maintain its credibility. Éric Alauzet (EELV)
emphasized that banking supervision by the ECB would
increase transparency. He only deplored that not all EU
member states and banks were covered, and he would
have liked to see a better involvement of the European
Parliament to improve the democratic legitimacy of the
process. Pierre Lequillier (UMP) also believed that the
ECB would add clarity and independence to banking
supervision, but would have liked national specificities to
be taken into account. Valérie Rabault (PS) would have
liked banking supervision to go further and to impose
higher capital requirements in some cases.
However, Annick Girardin (Radical party of the left)
criticized the complexity of the four different criteria to
determine whether a bank falls under ECB supervision.
Like Éric Alauzet, she wondered why banking supervi-
sion and banking resolution were not dealt with by the
same institution, but she felt that the ECB was the wrong
choice, due to crisis resolution having little to do with
monetary policy, and that this new function could have
undermined the independence and credibility of the ECB.
Danielle Auroi (EELV) also opposed the appointment of
the ECB as supervisor.
The Bundestag debated the SSM on 17 May 2013
(protocol 17241). The principle of European banking
supervision was not particularly controversial. In fact,
almost all speakers with the exception of Axel Troost
(Die Linke) were in favour of European banking supervi-
sion. Troost also agreed in theory but felt that therewere
not enough guarantees that supervision would become
stricter and better than the German Bafin. He also ques-
tioned art. 127 TFEU as a legal basis for banking union.
Polarization mostly existed on whether the ECB
was an appropriate choice as banking supervisor and
whether it would be able to neatly separate banking
supervision and monetary policy in-house. As Manfred
Zöllmer (SPD) argued, the ECB would be a business
partner and creditor. By contrast, the MPs from the
governing parties defended the ECB’s ability to sepa-
rate its two functions (e.g., Volker Wissing, FDP; Peter
Aumer, CDU/CSU). Although Ralph Brinkhaus (CDU/CSU)
did question the ability of the European Parliament
to scrutinize the ECB in its role as banking supervisor.
Institutionalized ideas about the importance of central
bank independence thus played a role.
The other German plenary debates also show that
the opposition (the Greens and Die Linke) questioned
the choice of the ECB as supervisor, that the SPD main-
tained scepticism towards the ECB after it entered gov-
ernment in 2013 and that even CDU MPs argued, as
late as 2016, that the ECB should eventually be replaced
by a separate body. There was also broad agreement
that European banking supervision should focus only on
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system-relevant banks, i.e., both government and oppo-
sition parties defended the same structurally relevant
economic interests in line with H1.
5.2.2. The Positions on the Single Resolution
Mechanism and Single Resolution Fund
In AN debate 20150219 of 5 May 2015 on the SRF agree-
ment, all speakers supported the SRM and SRF’s goal
of breaking the feedback loop between bank failures
and sovereign debt problems and of protecting the tax-
payer from the costs of bank resolutions. As with the
SSM, criticism focused less on the principle, but rather
on the execution, and especially the German influence
on the SRM and the SRF. It is clear that all speakers
would have preferred a solution closer to the European
Commission’s proposals. Thus, Danielle Auroi (EELV) and
Jacques Krabal (Radical party of the left) questioned
the complexity of the SRM procedures and the multi-
ple actors involved. Jérôme Chartier (UMP) questioned
whether the resolution of a crisis within 48 hours was
realistic given that systemic banks might have to pro-
duce 1,800 pages of resolution plans. Jean-Paul Dupré
(Groupe socialiste, républicain et citoyen), wondered
whether the non-participation of the UK and Sweden
would weaken the positive effects of the SRM and SRF.
The pressure on the government was again low.
A common theme taken up by almost all speakers is
the size of the SRF, with the target of €55 billion being
considered laughably small, unlikely to be able to sup-
port the failure of large banks and thus unable to truly
protect taxpayers from the fallout of bank resolutions.
Danielle Auroi (EELV) also demanded a faster mutualiza-
tion of funds and criticized the national compartments.
These two arguments reflect the importance of materi-
al interests, as France has a number of large banks that
might be too big for the SRF, and the resolution of which
would still have been costly for French taxpayers in a sys-
tem based on separate national compartments. Similarly,
several MPs specifically criticized the size of the French
contributions to the SRF, which they regarded as too high
given the low level of deposits (e.g., Jérôme Chartier,
UMP; Jean-Christophe Fromantin, UDI). An exception
was Éric Alauzet (EELV), who found that the high contri-
butions of the French banks reflected the risks they took
and their size. He argued that banks that are too big to
fail have a responsibility towards the community.
The Bundestag debate on the SRM and the SRF of
14 March 2014 (protocol 18021) also shows that all
speakers supported the basic principle of an SRM and
SRF. Themost critical speaker was Axel Troost (Die Linke),
who liked the general idea but doubted that this specif-
ic system would be able to protect taxpayers. He ques-
tioned the ability of the SRF to handle a systemic cri-
sis or even just the failure of a very large bank. He also
argued that the current contributions to the national
funds (including the German fund) were too small to
add up to the target of the SRF. Another opposition MP,
Gerhard Schick (Bündnis 90/the Greens), criticized the
complex decision-making structures of the SRM and SRF
and the creation of national compartments within the
SRF. He also questioned the use of an intergovernmen-
tal agreement as opposed to EU law.
By contrast, government MPs such as Klaus-Peter
Flosbach (CDU/CSU) and Manfred Zöllmer (SPD) argued
that the current set-up with national compartments and
a longer period during which the fund would be filled
struck a healthy balance, as very high levies on banks
might choke off the supply of credit to the economy. Both
Flosbach and Hans Michelbach (also CDU/CSU) argued
that the absence of national compartments would lead
to the communitarization of debt. This reflected both the
material interests of German banks by preventing ‘their’
contributions to be used to bail out foreign banks and
Germany’s perspective as a creditor state wary of risk-
sharing and financial transfers.
The SRF experiences moderate polarization along
government-opposition lines: while all parties agreed on
the basic idea of an SRF, the opposition (the Greens and
Die Linke) would have preferred a much larger fund that
would become operational far sooner. All German par-
ties defended the savings and cooperative banks against
forced participation in this scheme, though, which also
reflects the importance of sectoral interests in line
with H1.
5.2.3. The Positions on European Deposit Insurance
Scheme
In AN debate 20140152 of 30 January 2014,MPs from vir-
tually all parties demanded the creation of a European
deposit insurance scheme. Valérie Rabault (PS) further
specified that the Cypriot crisis showed that a mutualiza-
tion of national guarantees was crucial for the avoidance
of bank runs.
In the case of the Bundestag, the European
Commission’s musing on the possible introduction of a
European deposit insurance scheme was first discussed
in the debate of 5 November 2015 recorded in protocol
18133. The debate was short (25 minutes long) but heat-
ed. The first speaker, Antje Tillmann (CDU/CSU), praised
the progressmade inmoving towards banking union and
the European initiatives to stabilize the banking system
and reduce the risks for taxpayers. But she also point-
ed towards the non-transposition of key elements by
numerous states, e.g., the fact that only 17 states had
implemented the Directive on bank resolutions despite
a deadline of late 2014, or the fact that only about
half of the member states had transposed the Deposit
Guarantee Directive. In addition, she pointed out that
the first payments into the SRF were only due in 2016,
and that banks had until 2024 to feed funds covering
0.8% of deposits into the system. She also felt that states
still posed a risk to banks and vice versa. She conclud-
ed that the proposal for EDIS came too early and that
national systems had to be fully operational first. This
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criticism was shared by Alexander Radwan (CDU/CSU),
Manfred Zöllmer and Christian Petry (both SPD), who
also opposed the communitarization of deposit insur-
ance and suggested that the Commission should first
control the national transposition of existing rules before
it creates a new European system. They saw a risk that
German savers would have to pay for mistakes in other
countries. Radwan and Petry also argued that the risks
across member states had to become more comparable.
This reflects Germany’s material interests as a transfer-
adverse creditor state.
The fact that savings and cooperative banks should
not be covered by EDIS was a concern shared by all politi-
cians, even those in favour of EDIS. For example, Axel
Troost (Die Linke)—usually not an ally of CDU, agreed
that the local saving and cooperative banks should not be
part of EDIS, because of the risk that their contributions
would be used to save Zockerbanken (gambling banks) or
large risk-taking banks abroad. However, he stated that
he would be open to EDIS covering the same type of
bank, and in that case, national funds could be used to
support banks abroad. He also argued that a European
system would be more effective to combat future crisis
and that the larger German banks—like Deutsche Bank—
might well require such a system themselves at some
point. Gerhard Schick (Bündnis 90/the Greens) agreed
that EDIS was the only means to avoid taxpayers hav-
ing to cover the costs of bank failure if the national
deposit guarantee system was insufficient, but he too
would exclude savings and cooperative banks due to
their distinctive features. Thus, sectoral interests were
again strongly defended by both government and oppo-
sition parties in line with H1.
6. Conclusion
Overall, in line with our expectations, the higher public
salience of banking union was reflected in a more proac-
tive scrutiny in the Bundestag compared to theAN.While
the AN only held four debates, two of which were con-
cerned with implementation, the Bundestag organized
18 debates on banking union, with 19 tabled resolutions
compared to two in the AN.
In addition, the polarization of banking union
was higher in the Bundestag, where a government–
opposition divide existed especially in the case of the
SRF. There was also some polarization on EDIS, but the
importance of savings and cooperative banksmeant that
oppositionMPswere also partially critical of EDIS. French
MPs were generally highly supportive of banking union
and most of their criticism was that integration did not
go far enough. Differences between parties were com-
paratively minimal, and, in line with H3 and H4, the par-
liament was reactive and did not put much pressure
on government.
The support for the position of the German govern-
ment and the pressure to stick to it were both much
higher compared to France. This is the result of the
more proactive approach of the Bundestagwith farmore
tabled resolutions and early debates. On the one hand,
the government could lean on a cohesive majority, but
on the other, the opposition closely scrutinized the gov-
ernment’s performance and was quick to point out, for
example, that the European decision to allow the ESM
to recapitalize banks was a departure from the govern-
ment’s and parliament’s previous line. The numerous
(failed) tabled resolutions also hammered home certain
points such as the opposition to the use of taxpayermon-
ey (e.g., the ESM) for the recapitalization or rescuing
of banks, or the need to exclude the savings and coop-
erative banks from European banking supervision, the
SRM/SRF, and EDIS.
Finally, it is clear that sectoral interests had consider-
able influence in both parliaments: In Germany, the inter-
ests of cooperative and savings banks were defended by
both government and opposition parties. In addition, the
material interests of Germany as a creditor country wary
of financial transfers shaped its opposition to the mutu-
alization of risks across states. Similarly, French support
for a larger SRF and themutualization of risk can be inter-
preted as a concern with the potentially high costs to
the French taxpayer of resolving a large French nation-
al champion. The article thus agrees with the literature
on the importance of structural interests in the creation
of banking union. Ideas played a minor role, for example
with regard to the importance of central bank indepen-
dence in Germany. However, the debates do not reflect
the fact that the German public is in fact more open
towards the principle idea of European integration in this
policy area than the French public.
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